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Abstract 
This article traces some of the intellectual lines of force concomitant to the constitution of a 
research field of Digital War. It submits that, while it may serve as a convenient shorthand for 
information and communication technologies concordant with common parlance, the concept 
of the “digital” cannot in itself provide a dependable referent for demarcating such an 
investigative terrain. This consideration raises in turn a series of further conceptual, 
methodological, and empirical challenges for scholars working in this emerging field, among 
which are the deep history of information technologies and their martial entanglements, the 
requirements of scientific and technical literacy, and engagement with the philosophy of 
technology.   
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The inaugural issue of any new journal is naturally the occasion to set out and reflect upon its 
intellectual rationale and chosen terrain of investigation. While the key prefatory duties 
obviously fall to the founding editors, I would nevertheless like to take this opportunity to 
probe at the possible contours of the proposed field of “Digital War.” I will begin by 
interrogating the category of the “digital” and what its empirical referent might be in the 
study of armed conflict. From such a problematisation arise a number of conceptual, 
methodological, and empirical challenges that I will endeavour to tease out, in however a 
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partial and preliminary fashion, in the hope that they can contribute to stimulating productive 
debate over the fundamental orientations that should guide the study of Digital War. 
 
The journal editors explain that Digital War denotes “the ways in which digital technologies 
and media are transforming how wars are fought, experienced, lived, represented, reported, 
known, conceptualised, remembered and forgotten.”
1
 The key analytical category is here 
unmistakably that of the “digital” which, at least in this formulation, appears as the causative 
agent of multi-faceted mutations in the contemporary phenomenon of war. In his recent 
homonymous monograph, William Merrin (2019, 1) further insists that the term of Digital 
War does not designate “a new form of war but an entire, emerging research field.” 
Therefore, we should quite rightly not expect to observe a single, coherent form of conflict 
that would obey a unitary set of digital principles but more plausibly to encounter a congerie 
of technologies through which martial life is being endlessly refracted and reshaped. Indeed, 
in an age of planetary targeting, network hyper-connectivity, artificial intelligence, global 
surveillance, robotic swarming, cyber-hacking, and deepfake image synthesis, the cardinal 
role of emerging technologies within the contemporary landscape of conflict can hardly 
suffer dispute. Yet this still leaves unanswered the question of what we mean exactly by the 
“digital” and with what rigour we might be able bound its domain. 
 
Etymologically, digital refers back to our “digits”, the human fingers on our two hands that 
we use to count on a base 10. The technical meaning of the term, adopted in the mid-
twentieth century, follows from it quite logically. Digital refers here to the use of numerical 
integers (typically from a base 2 composed of 0 and 1 – the binary digit or bit) for the 
purpose of information storage, processing, and communication. Digital technology is 





habitually contrasted with analogue technology for the different ways in which they 
respectively register and manipulate the varying values upon which they operate. Analogue 
machines deal exclusively with continuous signals from physical measurements. The 
telephone, in its original form invented in the nineteenth century, thus involved the two-way 
translation of continuous changes in the amplitude and frequency of soundwaves into an 
equally continuous and strictly proportional flow of electrical current. Digital machines, on 
the other hand, handle discrete values drawn from a finite range of values. To stay with our 
example, a continuous waveform treated by a digital telecommunication channel must first be 
“sampled” into discrete numerical values before it can be processed.  
 
Analogue computing correspondingly relies on a direct analogy, or systematic relationship, 
between the computer’s physical processes and those of any system it is modelling or 
simulating. This lineage of computing encompasses a long history of devices that include 
Ancient Greek gear mechanisms (Jones 2017), medieval astrolabes, electro-mechanical naval 
fire control computers (Mindell 2002, 19-68), and the humble slide ruler. Digital computing, 
for its part, decomposes the modelled system into discrete steps to be run through 
sequentially. With the progressive digitisation of our electronic world since the invention of 
the programmable electronic digital computer during the Second World War, we have 
become used to thinking of digital technology as inherently superior to its analogue 
counterpart, now relegated to the status of primitive predecessor. However, digital 
computing’s reliance on discrete, step-by-step operations has never been an ideal solution for 
solving continuous or highly dynamic problems, regardless of how infinitesimal the steps of 
its discretisation model.  Although digital computers did from early on boast greater precision 
and flexibility, electronic analogue computers held significant benefits in terms of accuracy 
and speed for the treatment of large problems and specialist tasks into the 1970s, notably 
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within the military and such high-profile technological ventures as the Apollo space 
programme. Analogue computing was eventually displaced virtually everywhere by advances 
in the performance of digital machines and their comparative ease in programmability, even 
as the analogue approach retained certain relative advantages. 
 
Indeed, it appears likely we are today on the cusp of an analogue revival. As the current 
architecture of digital switching nears its physical limits with transistors being ever more 
tightly squeezed onto correspondingly energy-hungry and heat-dissipating microchips, the 
large energy efficiencies afforded by analogue computing render it increasingly attractive, 
especially in conjunction with the trends towards miniaturisation and autonomous robotics.
2
 
Developments in the field of neuromorphic computing where neural networks are literally 
built up from analogue circuits (rather than simulated within digital architectures) are another 
area of promise.
3
 Indeed, the question of whether the brain ultimately operates according to 
digital or analogue principles, some combination thereof, or an entirely distinct model of 
neural computation remains unsettled, suggesting the possibility that the higher ambitions for 
artificial intelligence or brain-computer interfaces may not be realisable without departing 
from the strict confines of the digital domain (Piccinini and Bahar 2013). 
 
In a more speculative vein, George Dyson (2019) submits that, just as early digital computers 
were assembled through the repurposing of analogue components such as vacuum tubes to 
record and process discrete numerical increments, we are now increasingly seeing analogue 
systems supervening upon the digital. The social network that is Facebook is certainly held 
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together by the pieces of digital code running on billions of local machines. Yet Dyson 
ventures that the social network itself – the topological system emergent from the 
connectivity of all its users – is best understood as a massive analogue computer whose 
parallel operations dwarf in complexity that of the supporting code. User interactions 
incessantly update the network, generating a social graph that registers the resulting 
topologies as continuous weighted functions that in turn shape in real-time the information 
presented to the user. As such, the social network does not so much construct an abstracted 
model of the social graph as become the social graph itself, ceaselessly feeding back onto 
itself. 
 
All of this to say that the “digital”, understood in its strict technical sense, cannot be a reliable 
marker of the phenomena that a field of Digital War would want to encompass. As is the case 
in both wider parlance and in the range of academic disciplines that have adopted the term, 
the invocation of the digital evidently gestures more broadly to the information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) that have become ubiquitous in our increasingly 
connected, automated, and mediatised world. The habitual looseness with which the label of 
“digital” is handled today is further evidenced by the common tendency to describe as 
“analogue” those social relations or phenomena deemed to either pre-date the advent of ICTs 
or still take place today outside of them. Highlighting this semantic slippage could perhaps be 
dismissed as a minor terminological quibble were its occurrence not all too often 
symptomatic of an insufficient engagement with both the technical specificity of individual 
ICTs and the deep sociocultural history of their emergences – a pitfall that the field of Digital 




As it happens, this history is profoundly entangled with that of armed conflict. And although 
it is undoubtedly essential to interrogate “how the properties and biases and uses and 
applications of digital technology have impacted upon conflict” (Merrin 2019, 1), it is no less 
vital to ask how war has itself shaped the “digital.” It is simply impossible to account for the 
genesis and development of ICTs to this day without an appreciation of the essential and 
persistent role played by the upheaval of war and the insatiable demands of its conduct. 
Approaching the object of digital war through the sole prism of the ways in which new 
technologies come to bear upon the manifestations and representations of armed conflict 
cannot therefore suffice. It is no less crucial to foster an encounter with the martial 
phenomena whose impulses ceaselessly make and unmake our world (Bousquet, Grove and 
Shah 2020). 
 
The military origin of computers is of course well known. Various electronic calculating 
machines were devised in great secret during the Second World War to assist in the critical 
tasks of breaking the enemy’s encrypted communications and calculating artillery firing 
tables. The development of nuclear weapons from the Manhattan Project onwards also 
involved considerable and sustained military investment into high-speed computing machines 
capable of solving the necessary physics. Although the corporate giant of IBM would come 
to play a key role in the subsequent civilian diffusion of computers, the military remained a 
crucial actor throughout the Cold War, whether as a major client to IBM or as a pioneer of 
ICT breakthroughs such as real-time user interfaces, artificial intelligence, computer 
graphics, satellite geopositioning, or the Internet.
4
 It is only with the growth in the global 
business and consumer market for computers and Internet services of the last few decades 
that the military has taken on a more peripheral role. New corporate titans have arisen that do 
                                                 
4
 An array of landmark ICT systems were developed under military aegis in the decades after World War Two, 
among which ENIAC, MANIAC, Project Whirlwind, SAGE, ARPANET, and NAVSTAR GPS.  
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not need to cater specifically to a military clientele which now frequently resorts to 
purchasing “commercial off-the-shelf” systems. The so-called Big Five tech companies of 
Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft also increasingly occupy the leading edge 
of such areas such as AI, data analytics, user interfaces, and virtual reality with R&D 
budgets, technological know-how, and data repositories that put in the shade anything even 
the US military can muster. This is not to say that key bodies within national security 
establishments such as DARPA or the NSA do not still play a major role today in 
accelerating and steering specific strands of technological development. Or that the Big Five 
are not drawn in, with various degrees of willingness and commercial interest, into the ambit 
of national security. The shifting relations between civilian and military spheres of ICT 
innovation and their implications for questions of war and security should in itself certainly 
be a major object of enquiry for Digital War. 
 
Working our way back through the genealogy of modern ICTs also leads us ineluctably to a 
set of foundational knowledges that still underpin much of our contemporary technological 
order and its cultural self-understanding. In particular, it is essential to appreciate how the 
mid-twentieth century emergence of a scientific concept of information (Aspray 1985, 
Geoghehan 2008) laid the ground for the now ubiquitous propensity to view both our world 
and ourselves in informational terms. Cardinal figures as Alan Turing, John Von Neumann, 
Claude Shannon, and Norbert Wiener, all of whom developed and refined their ground-
breaking ideas in scientific and engineering service of the Allied war effort, occupy 
prominent roles in this story (Heims 1980, Dyson 2013, Kline 2015). While it is necessary to 
resist the simplified heroic narratives that typically spring up around scientific “geniuses”, an 
understanding of their individual contributions still provides crucial insights into the forging 
of the “cyborg sciences” (Pickering 1985) and their subsequent dissemination. Wiener’s 
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founding of cybernetics as a new science of “control and communications in the animal and 
the machine” (Wiener 1948) is especially significant here. Wiener’s recasting of life in terms 
of goal-driven systems controlled by recursive information feedback loops has had a lasting 
influence, not least via its instantiation in the military during the Cold War (Edwards 1997, 
Bousquet 2008), and remains fundamental to any discussion of the increasingly post-human 
character of war today (Coker 2013). 
 
An appreciation of Digital War’s deep history can also help to preserve against the ever-
present temptation to presume our times to be exceptional and in fundamental rupture with all 
that has preceded it. Debates about the evolution of war since the end of the Cold War have 
been particularly prone to this kind of thinking with persistent talk of an ICT-enabled 
“Revolution in Military Affairs” and other radical transformations in armed conflict deemed 
to have changed everything (Cohen 1996, Owens 2001). Certainly, the visions of military 
omniscience and omnipotence that generally accompanied such theses have failed to 
materialise to date. Moreover, it bears underlining that for all the developments undergone in 
the conduct, experience, and representation of war in the last three decades, these arguably 
pale in comparison with the upheaval of the similar interval separating the opening shots of 
the First World War and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Indeed, many of 
the technologies that preoccupy us today were pioneered in this earlier period under the 
martial imperatives of the day and the necessity to mobilise, organise, and coordinate 
industrialised war economies and huge motorised armies deploying increasingly destructive 
weapons across vast, dispersed battlespaces. Modern radio telecommunications, remote 
sensing, geo-positioning, autonomous guidance, and high-speed calculating machines can all 
be traced back to this period (Bousquet 2018). In sum, only a solid grounding in the history 
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binding war with science and technology makes possible a nuanced and measured 
understanding of both the present’s continuities and breaks with the past.  
 
Nowhere are the insufficiencies that follow from the absence of such historical perspective 
more evident today than among the discussions surrounding the role of drones in global 
conflict. While the now vast literature on drones produced in the last decade has yielded some 
important and valuable studies (Chamayou 2015, Shaw 2016, Gusterson 2016), the 
disproportionate attention afforded to these systems by scholars verges on a pathology akin to 
“drone fetishism.” Not only does this infatuation come at the expense of other, less 
fashionable military programmes whose neglect is a loss to our understanding of 
contemporary war but all too often the drone is uncritically accepted as an exceptional and 
radically new technology in itself. By repositioning the drone within a wider historical and 
technological context, some of the more bombastic claims of novelty attributed to it begin to 
deflate. For the drone is both a concatenation of pre-existing technologies of flight, remote 
viewing and control, geo-positioning, and precision-guided munitions – each with their own 
respective genealogies – and the latest concretion of a set of military predilections that 
include casualty aversion, air power, and global projection. Moreover, most of the important 
issues usually raised by drone critics such as the radical asymmetry of risk, the blurring of 
assassination and war, the undermining of international law, and the lack of democratic 
accountability remain equally salient when related to other contemporary military 
deployments of aerial targeting, cruise missiles, or special forces operations. To be clear, the 
drone phenomenon is significant in coalescing an array of pre-existing trends and bringing 
them into sharper focus. It certainly merits our attention on this basis. But we should avoid 
reifying the “drone” – itself a broad category covering a proliferation of related yet distinct 
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technical objects embedded in larger techno-social infrastructures – as the primary cause of 
the wider aforementioned issues. 
 
Lurking behind all this is the spectre of “technological determinism” and the reductionist 
attribution of social and political developments to technological artefacts. Not only does such 
an outlook strip human societies of agency over the directions they take but it rests upon a 
highly impoverished understanding of technology. The wider sociocultural context within 
which specific technologies are conceived, refined, produced, diffused, and put to use falls 
away with human societies rendered as virtually inert, passive surfaces upon which the 
effects of ex nihilo devices play themselves out. Such a perspective is rarely defended as an 
explicit theoretical positon but is manifest in latent forms within common unreflective 
accounts of technological change. Writings on military matters are especially liable to such 
lapses in their ascription of revolutions in military affairs to the inexorable effects of 
particular technological developments (see Bousquet 2017). 
 
The remedy to such paltry thinking does not however lie in veering to the opposing extremity 
of dissolving technology in a generalised social constructionism that treats technical objects 
as merely the docile emanations of primary sociocultural forces. This in turn deprives 
technological artefacts of their own powers to shape the social field and rearrange its 
constitutive relations, dispensing analysts with the need to wrestle with the detail of their 
technical workings. Ultimately, the only way to escape this sterile opposition is to reject any 
hard and fast delineation of society and technology and to recognise that they share in a 
common sociotechnical condition within which neither can claim to a pristine, autonomous 
existence. Social intercourse in human societies is continuously supported and mediated by 
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technical objects which are themselves concrescent forms embedded in but not reducible to 
their social milieus (Simondon 2011).  
 
The philosophical and methodological approach known as “assemblage theory” provides a 
particularly apposite framework for making sense of this entanglement and co-constitution of 
technology and society (DeLanda 2016, Buchanan 2020, Acuto and Curtis 2014). The 
concept of the assemblage covers any heterogeneous ensemble of related elements that cut 
across the various biological, social, and technological strata of reality while possessing some 
collective consistency and efficacious mode of operability. Assemblages can be found at any 
scale, being themselves composed of further assemblages and serving as constitutive 
elements for still other assemblages, with relations of co-determination and recursive 
causality operant in all directions. From this perspective, a rifle, a soldier, a platoon, and an 
army are all assemblages with no precedence or causal pre-eminence to be afforded a priori 
to either of them. Any specific analytical focus grounds itself in the particular empirical 
commitment made by the analyst - who in turn must not be thought of as a sovereign, aloof 
observer but as forming a new assemblage through the terms of their empirical encounter. 
Whether or not Digital War scholars are disposed to adopt an assemblage framework in their 
own work, they certainly will not be able to eschew a serious engagement with the 
philosophy of technology and the thorny question of how to theorise the relation of society 
and technology (Feenberg 2002). 
 
An important correlate of recognising the intimate braiding of technology and society is the 
necessity for scholars to acquire a robust knowledge of technical objects both in terms of 
their inner workings and the wider technoscientific cultures from which they emerge and 
continue to depend on (Bousquet 2009). One cannot write other than in broad generalities 
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about the effects of AI, simulation, malware, social media or robotics without prying into the 
general operating principles and specific instantiations of algorithms, networking protocols 
programming languages, neural networks or servomechanisms. This is no small challenge, to 
be sure, given that most scholars in the humanities and social sciences lack the scientific or 
technical training possessed by professionals in these specialised fields. Nevertheless, it is in 
our time both an epistemic imperative and political obligation that we invest these fields if we 
are to meaningfully fathom the depths of the challenges posed by technological civilisation 
and devise adequate responses to them. The appropriate level of technical and scientific 
expertise required is an open question whose answer is inevitably conditioned by the specific 
coordinates of the investigation and resources available to us. Yet pushing at the very limits 
of our understanding must evidently remain here the normative injunction that it ought to be 
for any endeavour seeking to advance human knowledge. Where necessary and possible, 
collaborative work with relevant specialists in the scientific and technical fields can only be 
welcome in this regard.  
 
By way of conclusion, I want to underline that I do not seek with this brief intervention to 
either curtail or dictate what the remit of Digital War should be. As per the editors’ invitation, 
this emerging field should be a capacious one that draws widely on plurality of research 
interests, methodological orientations, and disciplinary approaches. I do however want to 
insist on the necessity for the burgeoning scholarly community that will surely catalyse 
around the journal to reflect upon and advance the major conceptual and empirical issues that 
lie before us. For it will surely require nothing less than a radical overhaul in our habits of 
thought and entirely new bodies of knowledge to accompany it if we ever are to forge the 







Acuto, Michele and Curtis, Simon. eds. 2014. Re-assembling International Theory: 
Assemblage Thinking and International Relations. London: Palgrave. 
 
Aspray, William. 1985. The Scientific Conceptualization of Information: A Survey. Annals 
of the History of Computing 7(2): 117-140. 
 
Bousquet, Antoine. 2008. Cyberneticizing the American War Machine: Science and 
Computers in the Cold War. Cold War History 8(1): 77-102. 
 
Bousquet, Antoine. 2009. The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the 
Battlefields of Modernity. London: Hurst Publishers. 
 
Bousquet, Antoine. 2017. A Revolution in Military Affairs? Changing Technologies and 
Changing Practices of Warfare. In McCarthy, Daniel R. ed. Technology and World Politics: 
An Introduction. London: Routledge, pp.165-181. 
 
Bousquet, Antoine. 2018. The Eye of War: Military Perception from the Telescope to the 
Drone. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Bousquet, Antoine, Grove, Jairus and Shah, Nisha. 2020. Becoming War: Towards a Martial 




Buchanan, Ian. 2020. Assemblage Theory and Method: An Introduction and Guide. London:  
Bloomsbury Academic. 
 
Chamayou, Grégoire. 2015. A Theory of the Drone. New York: New Press. 
 
Cohen, Eliot A. 1996. A Revolution in Warfare. Foreign Affairs 75: 37-54. 
 
Coker, Christopher. 2013. Warrior Geeks: How 21
st
 Century Technology is Changing the 
Way We Fight and Think About War. London: Hurst Publishers. 
 
DeLanda, Manuel. 2016. Assemblage Theory. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
 
Dyson, George. 2013. Turing's Cathedral: The Origins of the Digital Universe. London: 
Penguin. 
 
Dyson, George. 2019. The Third Law. In Brockham, John. ed. Possible Minds: Twenty-Five 
Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. 
 
Edwards, Paul N. 1997. The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold 
War America. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Feenberg, Andrew. 2002. Questioning Technology. London: Routledge. 
 
Geoghegan, Bernard Dionysius. 2008. The Historiographic Conception of Information: A 




Gusterson, Hugh. 2016. Drone: Remote Control Warfare. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Heims, Steve J. 1980. John Von Neumann and Norbert Wiener: From Mathematics to the 
Technologies of Life and Death. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Kline, Ronald R. 2015. The Cybernetics Moment or Why We Call Our Age The Information 
Age. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. 
 
Jones, Alexander. 2017. A Portable Cosmos: Revealing the Antikythera Mechanism, 
Scientific Wonder of the Ancient World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Merrin, William. 2019. Digital War: A Critical Introduction. London: Routledge. 
 
Mindell, David A. 2002. Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing 
before Cybernetics. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Owens, Bill. 2001. Lifting the Fog of War. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Piccinini, Gualtiero and Bahar, Sonya. 2013. Neural Computation and the Computational 
Theory of Cognition. Cognitive Science 37(3): 453-488. 
 





Shaw, Ian G. R. 2016. Predator Empire: Drone Warfare and Full Spectrum Dominance. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Simondon, Gilbert. 2011. The Essence of Technicity. Deleuze Studies 5(3): 406–424. 
 
Wiener, Norbert. 1948. Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the 
Machine. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
